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Abstract: In contemporary debates about legal responsibility for sexual miscon-
duct, the status of “affomative consent” is front and center. Most often asso-
ciated with the campus rape crisis and the enforcement of Title IX by colleges
and universities, affirmative consent places responsibility on individuals who
initiate sex to secure the affirmative permission of their partners before engaging
in sexual conduct. Going beyond “no means no,” affirmative consent is best
captured by the slogan “only yes means yes” and aims to protect those sexual
assault victims who react passively or silently in the face of sexual aggression,
even though they do not desire to have sex and would not have initiated the
sexual activity if they had been given the choice. The criminal law in most states
has not yet caught up with these developments and has continued to require
either a showing of “force” on the part of the defendant or proof of a verbal
objection on the part of the victim.
Given its prominence, one might expect affirmative consent to emerge as a
central issue in the revision of the Restatement (Third)’s provisions on consent.
Instead, affirmative consent makes an appearance only briefly in the
Restatement's commentary and has not affected the core black letter statements
of the law of consent. Although purporting to be neutral, the approach of the
Restatement (Third) is incompatible with affirmative consent, both in the
Restatement's definitions of actual and apparent consent and in its determina-
tion to assign the burden of proof to the plaintiff instead of the defendant.
Because there is no controlling precedent that would prevent the Restatement
(Third) from embracing affirmative consent, the Restatement (Third) is free to
follow the Title IX model and incorporate affirmative consent into the body of
tort law. This article makes the case for adopting affirmative consent in sexual
misconduct tort cases, even if the criminal law in any given jurisdiction con-
tinues to apply a more defendant-oriented consent rules.
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In contemporary debates about legal responsibility for sexual misconduct, the
status of “affirmative consent” is front and center. Most often associated with
the campus rape crisis and enforcement of Title IX by colleges and universities,
affirmative consent places responsibility on individuals who initiate sex to
secure the affirmative permission or consent of their partners before engaging
in sexual conduct. In popular parlance, affirmative consent goes beyond the
mandate that “no means no” and is often connected to the slogan “only yes
means yes.” Although the concept has been around for decades,1 it has only
recently gained traction as a legal strategy to bolster sexual autonomy, espe-
cially for women.
The affirmative consent movement shines a spotlight on the crucial role
“consent” has played and continues to play in demarcating lawful from unlaw-
ful sexual conduct, in both the criminal and civil law. It has been vigorously
debated (and at this point rejected) in the current effort to revise the Model Penal
Code2 and was the centerpiece of the Obama-era overhaul of Title IX standards
for college disciplinary actions,3 now likely in jeopardy with the change of
administration. Aside from the scorecard of victories and defeats for affirmative
consent, however, it seems clear that the perennial struggle over legal limits on
sexual misconduct will continue to center on the definition, application, and
meaning of consent. Although many feminists – most prominently Catharine
MacKinnon4 – would prefer to jettison consent as the touchstone of legality and
concentrate on refurbishing the meaning of “coercion” to determine what con-
stitutes rape and sexual assault, a newer generation of feminists has embraced
what Deborah Turkheimer calls “the culture of consent” and seem intent on
1 Antioch College was the first educational institution to adopt an affirmative consent policy in
1991, requiring that “if one person wants to initiate moving to a higher level of sexual intimacy
in an interaction, that person is responsible for getting the verbal consent of the other person(s)
involved.” See Phil McCombs, Taking a Look at Love, WASH. POST, 16th February 1996, at F5. For
early academic advocacy of affirmative consent, see Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality and
the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 SO. CAL. L. REV. 777, 836 (1988) (advocating mutuality
model of sexual relationships); Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, 8 LAW & PHIL. 217,
233–237 (1989) (advocating model of communicative sexuality); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking
Sexual Autonomy Seriously, 11 LAW & PHIL. 35, 74 (1992).
2 See infra at n. 38.
3 See infra at nn. 61–63.
4 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARDS A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 175 (1989).
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reclaiming consent and making it a focal point for social mobilization and
change.5
Given the swirl of activity around affirmative consent, one might expect it to
emerge as a central issue in the revision of the Restatement (Third)’s provisions
on consent.6 However, affirmative consent makes an appearance only briefly in
the commentary to the new provisions and has not affected the core black letter
statements of the law of consent. On the surface, the Restatement (Third)
purports to take the position that states are free to adopt affirmative consent
in cases of sexual battery and to send a neutral signal on whether taking such a
step would be advisable. However, just below the surface, the signal from the
Restatement is decidedly more mixed. By retaining the traditional definitions of
both actual consent7 and apparent consent,8 the Restatement reinforces a con-
sent regime that is incompatible with acceptance of affirmative consent.
Additionally, by choosing to assign the plaintiff the burden of proving her lack
of consent,9 the Restatement (Third) compounds the difficulty of incorporating
affirmative consent into the body of tort law.
As a preliminary matter, I should note that my comments on the consent
provisions in the Restatement (Third) are quite limited in scope. My sole focus is
on intentional tort claims arising from sexual conduct, even though the
Restatement covers the full range of consent cases, many of which, of course,
have nothing to do with sexual conduct. Additionally, in this essay, I do not
discuss the Restatement’s provision on incapacity, duress and substantial mis-
take (§15) that determines those exceptional instances in which a person’s
consent is deemed ineffective.10 Instead, my analysis is directed at the core
meanings of consent, the basic threshold determination in intentional tort cases.
Despite its limited scope, the topic of consent in sexual conduct cases is
important and complicated. Sexual conduct cases are a distinctive subset of
consent cases that repeatedly surface in the Reporters’ comments, notes and
illustrations. Together with medical consent cases and claims arising in the
context of athletics and sports, they comprise the bulk of the discussion on
consent in the Restatement (Third) and deserve scrutiny in their own right.
5 Deborah Tuerkheimer, Rape on and off Campus, 65 EMORY L.J. 1, 8 (2015).
6 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW THIRD TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS §§12–19 (P.D. No. 4;
6th March 2017) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) or RESTATEMENT].
7 See infra at n. 66.
8 See infra at n. 73.
9 See infra at n. 82.
10 My analysis also does not cover other Restatement provisions on consent that address
specific issues, i. e., scope of consent (§14), implied-in-law consent (§17), emergency doctrine
(§18), inadequate consent to medical treatment as battery (§19).
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It also bears mentioning that, even with respect to this limited topic, it is
very difficult to do justice in a short essay to an effort as sophisticated and
complex as the Restatement (Third). Although my comments are largely critical
and will suggest that the Restatement has not gone far enough to protect the
sexual autonomy of plaintiffs, in many respects, the document is quite progres-
sive and is a far cry from earlier Restatements that seemed oblivious and even
antagonistic to the interests of women and other victims of sexual violence and
exploitation. There is much in the Third Restatement for feminists to admire. For
this essay, however, I have decided to defer the praise and cut right to the chase.
This essay begins with a description of affirmative consent, noting its key
features and pointing out some of the ambiguities and the difficulties lawmakers
encounter in trying to operationalize the concept.11 I then attempt to distill the
voluminous literature on consent to present the most compelling rationales and
arguments for adopting some version of affirmative consent.12 To do so, it is
necessary to spend some time recounting the ignominious history of criminal
rape laws because the criminal law continues to dominate the broader cultural
debate on consent.13 Before moving to torts and the Restatement, the essay
briefly discusses consent-related developments in two major civil rights statutes,
Title VII (governing discrimination in employment) and Title IX (governing
discrimination in education), that form the backdrop for analysis of consent in
the civil litigation context.14
The rest of the essay is devoted to describing the approach of the
Restatement (Third) and explaining how that approach is incompatible with a
concept of affirmative consent.15 I make the argument that the Restatement
(Third) could embrace affirmative consent without deviating from its
Restatement mission and that it should do so.16 Finally, I suggest that the
Restatement (Third) adopt a separate provision embracing affirmative consent
in sexual conduct cases.17 As a second-best option, I would prefer that the
Restatement take no position on whether its general provisions on actual con-
sent, apparent consent and burden of proof apply to sexual conduct cases,
unambiguously clearing the way for states to adopt affirmative consent in
such cases.18
11 See infra at nn. 19–25.
12 See infra at nn. 26–55.
13 See infra at nn. 26–33.
14 See infra at nn. 56–65.
15 See infra at nn. 66–94.
16 See infra at nn. 95–109.
17 See infra at n. 110.
18 Id.
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1 The meaning of affirmative consent
As with any evolving concept, there are many variations of affirmative consent,
as the non-uniform wording of disciplinary codes in colleges and universities
across the country will attest, For our purposes, however, the essential features
of the concept are captured by the definition of affirmative consent found in
California legislation that requires all higher education institutions in that state
to incorporate affirmative consent definitions into their disciplinary codes. That
legislation provides:
“Affirmative consent” means affirmative, conscious, and voluntary agreement to engage in
sexual activity. It is the responsibility of each person involved in the sexual activity to
ensure that he or she has the affirmative consent of the other or others to engage in the
sexual activity. Lack of protest or resistance does not mean consent, nor does silence mean
consent. Affirmative consent must be ongoing throughout a sexual activity and can be
revoked at any time. The existence of a dating relationship between the persons involved,
or the fact of past sexual relations between them, should never by itself be assumed to be
an indicator of consent.19
The California definition of affirmative consent has four key features. First and
foremost, it imposes a responsibility or duty on the actor or initiator of sexual
activity to ensure that his or her partner has affirmatively consented to sex.
Second, it clarifies that silence or a lack of protest or resistance on the victim’s
part – victim responses that are sometimes regarded as ambiguous or even
probative of consent in the context of sexual conduct – do not qualify as
affirmative consent. Third, it conceptualizes sexual activity as comprising dif-
ferent acts or stages. Rather than focusing solely on penetration as the defining
stage of sexual activity, it requires that consent be ongoing and capable of being
revoked at any time. Finally, it prohibits reliance on the fact that the parties had
a dating relationship or had prior sexual relations as a reason for presuming that
sexual activity between them was consensual.
Although the affirmative consent statute states that each of the parties has a
responsibility, building in a mutual duty, it is important to note that when actual
disputes over consent arise, frequently the allegation will be that one party
(most often, but not invariably, a man) was the initiator or aggressor and failed
to secure the consent of the other party (most often, but not invariably, a
woman). Despite its gender neutral and mutual duty terminology, the definition
of affirmative consent tracks a recurring problem in rape and sexual assault
19 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67,386 (West 2015).
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cases, namely, whether consent was secured from the party who did not initiate
the activity.
The rest of the statute tends to flesh out the meaning of “affirmative” in
affirmative consent, in both a positive and a negative sense. On the positive side,
it highlights that the person consenting must be “conscious,” ruling out the
possibility that a sleeping or unconscious party could consent. It also describes
the requisite consent as constituting a “voluntary agreement,” emphasizing the
exercise of free will on the part of each party. Lastly, it describes the requisite
consent in active, dynamic terms, characterizing it as ongoing and capable of
disappearing through revocation. On the negative side, it contrasts “affirmative”
consent with submission or acquiescence. This is accomplished by specifying
that consent cannot be presumed from passive responses from a victim, such as
silence, the failure to protest or resist, or the simple fact of a relationship
between the parties, absent current indication of the party’s agreement to have
sex on the particular occasion.
While the definition of affirmative consent in the California statute is quite
detailed, it is not invariably tied to a particular theoretical or philosophical
orientation and is better understood as a pragmatic attempt to repudiate earlier,
less protective definitions of consent, particularly in the criminal law, which I
will discuss shortly. For now, it is enough to point out that it is possible to fit
affirmative consent within both a “mental state” and a “performative” account
of consent.20
The mental state account of consent focuses on the private, subjective
attitude of the party giving consent, while the performative account of consent
focuses on the consenting party’s public manifestation or behavior. In the
mental state account of affirmative consent, a key inquiry is often described as
whether the consenting party “desired” the sexual contact, even if such desire
was not communicated to the other party. In the performative account, consent
is an act that one does, rather than an existing mental state, i. e., the act of
giving permission to another to do something that would otherwise not be
allowed. Under the performative account, desire and consent are not always
linked because it is possible to desire something, yet refuse to give consent
(e. g., a person may want or desire to have sex with another, but nevertheless
refuses her permission because she is in an exclusive relationship with someone
else). Likewise, it possible to give one’s consent to have sex, even though desire
20 For a fuller discussions of the difference between a “mental state” and a “performative”
account of consent, see JOAN MCGREGOR, IS IT RAPE? ON ACQUAINTANCE RAPE AND TAKING
WOMEN’S CONSENT SERIOUSLY 116–135 (2005); ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL
RELATIONS 145–147 (2003).
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is lacking (e. g., a person consents to have sex with a long-term partner in order
to sustain the relationship).
Some theorists of affirmative consent have stated that the concept of affir-
mative consent fits best with a performative account of consent, mainly because
this account of affirmative consent makes it more difficult to infer consent in
ambiguous, contested circumstances.21 However, affirmative consent standards,
such as that found in the California legislation, can also be interpreted consis-
tently with a mental state account of consent. Because it is often impossible to
secure first-hand evidence of a party’s mental state, the California statute can be
read to provide mandatory standards for determining when there is sufficient
evidence of a party’s desires or wishes to warrant a finding of consent. Whether
the display (or performance) of consent operates as direct proof of affirmative
consent or is simply evidence of the requisite mental state associated with
affirmative consent is likely to remain an unanswered question. While it would
be helpful in particular cases to know whether the law of consent is aimed at a
mental state or a performative act, it is not essential to subscribe to one or the
other account to choose whether to endorse the basic concept of affirmative
consent.
Understanding the basic contours of affirmative consent, of course, is not
the same as reaching a consensus on how to identify affirmative consent in a
given context. Admittedly, like so many fundamental concepts in tort law –
think, negligence, reasonableness, and causation – affirmative consent is
somewhat ambiguous and open-ended. For example, Professor Aya Gruber –
a trenchant critic of affirmative consent – has developed an affirmative con-
sent scale to describe different formulations of affirmative consent that she
discerns in various university disciplinary codes.22 On Gruber’s scale, a more
regulatory (I might call it a “more protective”) formulation of affirmative
consent either requires a verbal “yes” from the person consenting, or its
behavioral equivalent, putting the obligation on the initiator to “stop, seek,
and obtain permission” before proceeding to engage in a specific sexual act
(e. g., moving from touching or kissing to intercourse).23 According to Gruber,
a less regulatory formulation of affirmative consent (short of specifying a duty
to “stop and ask”) requires the person giving consent to convey her consent
through “words and/or conduct that clearly and contemporaneously convey
agreement.”24
21 See MCGREGOR, supra note 20 at 125; WERTHEIMER, supra note 20 at 145–147.
22 Aya Gruber, Consent Confusion, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 431–432 (2016).
23 Id. at 432–433.
24 Id. at 436.
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In contrast to these formulations of affirmative consent, Gruber describes
two other formulations of consent (“contextual consent” and “no means no”)
that do not qualify as affirmative consent, although to some degree they are
more protective than traditional criminal law definitions of consent.25 Under
contextual consent, the victim’s words and conduct (including silence and
omissions) are scrutinized to determine whether “in context” they convey
agreement. Contextual consent fundamentally differs from the affirmative
consent approaches just mentioned in that, under contextual consent, fact-
finders are given free rein to interpret silence, inaction and pre-existing
relationships as consent and are permitted to find consent in cases in
which passive victims offer no verbal or other resistance. Finally, some
criminal laws require a finding of consent unless the victim expresses her
objection to the defendant’s action, making consent turn on the presence or
absence of a verbal objection or refusal. While these laws respect that “no
means no,” they too allow factfinders to infer consent from silence and
inaction and they presume consent (rather than a lack of consent) from a
victim’s passive response.
This essay borrows Gruber’s demarcation line to separate affirmative con-
sent formulations from other approaches. The important point here is that the
Restatement (Third) does not endorse any of the various formulations of affir-
mative consent she identifies, opting instead for a less protective approach that
resembles contextual consent.
Before looking more closely at the law as it relates to affirmative consent,
it is important to recognize that the movement toward affirmative consent is
more than just a push for specific legal reforms. By revising the very concept
that defines sexual violation, a newer generation of (mostly) women is also
seeking to influence and change cultural norms. Affirmative consent is a thus
a way to name and call out oppressive and sexist behaviors (the negative,
dangerous side of sex), while simultaneously claiming the right of every
person to be treated as an active, sexual being (the positive, pleasurable
side of sex). This dual focus on the negative and positive sets the affirmative
consent movement apart from earlier struggles that focused mainly on the
danger of sexual conduct and curbing the most severe forms of sexual abuse.
In this respect, the goal of affirmative consent is more connected to sexual
freedom and autonomy.
25 Id. at 438.
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2 The rationale for affirmative consent
The concept of affirmative consent cannot be fully understood without appre-
ciating the history of the law of consent as it has played out in the criminal
law. Affirmative consent is a responsive concept – it responds to (and rejects)
thinner, defendant-oriented versions of consent and offers in its place a more
robust, victim or plaintiff-oriented version of consent. Traditionally, consent
did not play an exclusive starring role in the criminal law of rape because rape
laws required not only “nonconsent” on the part of the victim but also proof of
“force” exercised by the defendant.26 The independent force requirement
meant that much nonconsensual sex (accomplished by means other than
force) was not criminalized. Moreover, the definition of “force” used by most
jurisdictions was exceedingly narrow, requiring a finding of overpowering
physical force or threat of physical force. Even though penetration of a non-
willing victim would intuitively seem to require application of force, most
states held that the intrinsic force used to accomplish penetration did not
qualify as sufficient force under the law. Instead, the criminal law generally
focused on whether the defendant had used external physical force, such as
hitting, punching or otherwise battering the victim. Notably, the force require-
ment meant that even victims who voiced their clear verbal objection to
having sex were not regarded as having been raped if the defendant was
able to accomplish the act without beating or threatening the victim with
physical harm.27
Traditionally, proof of non-consent under criminal rape laws also required
the victim to prove that she had physically resisted defendant’s actions.28 The
notion here was that any woman who did not desire sex would offer physical
resistance, equating passivity with consent. Originally, states required women to
prove that they had resisted “to the utmost.” Later, the requirement was relaxed
to require only “reasonable” physical resistance. In this respect, the physical
resistance requirement served to reinforce the force requirement because only if
a victim physically resisted would a defendant then need to apply overpowering
physical force to accomplish the act. Another reason that women who verbally
26 See MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 290–294 (3d ed. 2012)
(discussing changing criminal law definitions of rape).
27 A notorious case requiring extrinsic force which helped to catalyze the “no means no”
movement was Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A. 2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
28 See Michelle J. Anderson, All-American Rape Law, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 625, 628 (2005);
Leigh Bienen, Rape III—National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN’S RTS.
L. RPTR. 170, 181–184 (1980).
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objected, but did not physically resist, were deemed to have consented stemmed
from a widespread cultural belief about “normal” (hetero)sexual practices i. e.,
the belief that women were likely to offer “token resistance,” even when they
secretly desired to have sex.29
The traditional criminal law regime was ill-designed to protect the sexual
autonomy of women, to put it mildly. Together with a host of other legal rules
that applied only to rape prosecutions– the corroboration rule, the fresh com-
plaint rule, the cautionary jury instruction, and the introduction of the victim’s
sexual history – the force and non-consent requirements made it very difficult to
secure rape convictions. Indeed, the regime was so under-protective that some
feminist critics argued that the point of rape law was to protect male sexual
access to women, rather than to protect women against sexual aggression.30
Particularly when one considers that traditional rape laws did not criminalize
even forcible rape of a woman committed by her husband,31 the sexual access
hypothesis makes sense.
It is also important to mention how the race of the defendant and the race of
the victim factored into the equation. Scholars have long been aware that judges
and juries applied the elements of rape far less strictly in cases involving African
American defendants and white victims, going so far in some cases as to
presume that white women would not consent to having sexual intercourse
with black men.32 In cases in which African American women were victims of
rape, moreover, invidious presumptions about the natural promiscuity of min-
ority women often came into play, creating a strong presumption of consent.
Piecing together these disparate strands of legal doctrine and racially linked
presumptions, many theorists have viewed rape law as functioning to maintain
racial and gender hierarchies, placing women of all races at considerable risk of
sexual abuse and minority men at risk of being falsely accused of sexual
misconduct and punished severely.33
29 See David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 388–389 (2000) (discussing
studies repudiating “token resistance” belief).
30 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Rape: On Coercion and Consent in TOWARD A FEMINIST
THEORY OF THE STATE 171, 175 (1989).
31 See Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper Inferences:
A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L. J. 1465, 1475 (2003).
32 See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581
(1990); Jennifer Wriggins, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 103 (1983).
33 See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 139, 157–160 (1989).
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On an interpersonal level, the traditional regime seemed to mimic what
some have called a “conquest” model of sexuality,34 in which men are regarded
as potential conquerors that regularly use various aggressive tactics (physical
force, threats, coercion, deception, persistent requests) to secure sex from
women who sometimes resist them but sometimes just give up and give in.
Under this model, very few tactics are ruled out as unlawful and it is considered
natural for men to deploy them. More importantly, traditional criminal law
doctrine tended to side with the conquerors, labeling aggressive tactics as
mere persuasion or seduction rather than sexual assault. Famously, Catharine
MacKinnon charged that the law actually tolerated a high degree of forced sex
by setting the legal standards for rape and consent at the “normal level of force”
used by men to secure sex.35
The successive efforts at reforming rape law have altered this picture some-
what but have not succeeded in diminishing the need to push for more thorough-
going change. At this point, it seems safe to say that the “no means no” campaign
has met with some success. Some states have dropped their force requirement (at
least with respect to some degrees of sexual assault) and many no longer require
plaintiffs to prove physical resistance in order to establish non-consent. Other
states effectively place more weight on non-consent by holding that the force
requirement is met whenever a defendant persists in penetrating a woman who
has not consented, treating the intrinsic force needed to accomplish that act as
sufficient proof of force.36 A few states have even adopted versions of affirmative
consent to govern criminal prosecutions for sexual assault.37
In response to the variation in criminal law standards, the latest version of
the Model Penal Code has taken a middle-ground approach, eliminating the
force requirement for certain sexual offenses, but refusing to adopt any version
of affirmative consent.38 Thus, under the new provisions of the MPC, consent is
defined as “a person’s willingness to engage in a specific act of sexual penetra-
tion or sexual contact.”39 Adopting a contextual consent approach, the MPC
34 MCGREGOR, supra note 20, at .
35 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 173 (1989).
36 The leading case is State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 A2d 1266 (N.J. 1992).
37 See e. g., WIS. STATE. ANN. § 940.225 (4); VT. STAT. ANN. TIT. 13, § 3251 (3); M.T.S., 609 A2d at
1277 (permission …must be affirmative and . . given freely).
38 MODEL PENAL CODE, ARTICLE 213.0 (3), Approved Version of Section 213.0(3) (Jan. 2017). The
Comment to Article 213.0 (3) states that “[t]his provision does not adopt what is commonly
called “affirmative consent,” which is often understood to require an explicit word (“yes”) or
specific act (active cooperation) to communicate a relatively formal “agreement” to the specific
sexual act.”
39 Id., ARTICLE 213.0(3) (a).
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allows consent to “be inferred from behavior – both action and inaction — in the
context of all the circumstances,”40 thus allowing silence and passivity to count
as consent. The Code goes on to specify that “a clear verbal refusal – such as
“No,” “Stop,” or “Don’t” – establishes a lack of consent,” 41 thus embracing a
“no means no” version of consent.
Overall, these reforms have paved the way for holding defendants criminally
liable for nonconsensual intercourse, at least when victims register verbal objec-
tions. This is not an unimportant change. Respecting that “no means no” is
crucially important to recognizing an individual’s autonomy, for we can hardly
regard a regime that allows someone to proceed in the face of a victim’s
objections as protective of autonomy. I do not want to overstate the rate or
depth of change, however. Many states have retained a force requirement, some
states still require extrinsic force, and some still require a showing of physical
resistance on the part of the victim.42 To this degree, the ignominious history of
criminal rape laws is not really over yet.
Aside from the reluctance of some states to endorse “no means no,” there is
evidence that the law has failed to cut down appreciably on the high incidence
of acquaintance rape, the most common kind of rape43 and the type of sexual
abuse that has fueled the contemporary affirmative consent movement on
college campuses. An influential study estimated that 1 in 4 college women
had experienced rape or attempted rape, a figure that, while contested, has
formed the baseline for institutional and grassroots efforts addressing the pro-
blem.44 Legal and social science researchers have hypothesized that rape is
facilitated by the existence of rape-prone cultures in fraternities, men’s athletic
40 Id., ARTICLE 213.0(3) (b).
41 Id. ARTICLE 213.0(3) (e).
42 John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, “No” Still Means “Yes”: The Failure of Non-Consent Reform
Movement in American Rape and Sexual Assault Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1102–
1106 (2011).
43 Approximately 70% of rapes and sexual assaults against women are committed by a
relative, friend, or an acquaintance. NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION STUDY, VIOLENT
VICTIMIZATION OF COLLEGE STUDENTS (1995–2002), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
cvict_c.htm and http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/vvcs02.pdf.
44 The 1 in 4 figure was first generated in 1985 by Mary Koss in a published survey of 6,000
students at thirty-two college campuses. See Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, A New Form of Justice
for Rape Survivors, Nat’l J. (1st May 2015), http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/2015/ 05/
01/ New-Form-Justice-Rape-Survivors [http:// perma.cc/ BK75-8RNR]. Subsequent surveys in
2006 by the National Institute of Justice and in 2014 by a White House Task Force showed
that 19% and 23%, respectively, of undergraduate women were victims of sexual assault or
attempted sexual assault. Christopher P. Krebs, et al., The Campus Sexual Assault (CSA) Study,
U.S. Dep’t Just. 5–1 (October 2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153/pdf
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teams and other male-dominated settings in which many individuals continue to
subscribe to rape myths, including such beliefs that “women mean ‘yes’ when
they say ‘no,’ that women lie about rape, that women secretly desire coercive
sex, that men cannot control their natural sexual urges, and that rape by an
acquaintance or without a weapon is not ‘real rape.’”45 In such settings, more-
over, there is often considerable peer support for sexual assault, which one
scholar describes as a “driving force in contributing to its occurrence.”46 Outside
college campuses, researchers have found, the incidence of rape and sexual
assault may even be higher, fostered by gender inequality in the larger society
and subcultures that devalue women and girls and commodify and objectify
their sexuality.47
With the spotlight on acquaintance rape, there is now a growing apprecia-
tion for the grievous injury lack-of-consent intercourse may cause, even absent
infliction of additional external injuries. Victims have described the harm as
“degrading,” “scary,” and “excruciatingly painful” and have drawn a sharp
distinction between such harm and the regret or discomfort experienced from
“bad” (but consensual) sex.48 Nonconsensual sexual intercourse not only may
result in post-traumatic stress disorder, but may also produce a kind of harm
that goes to the core of a person’s identity, shattering a victim’s sense of self and
changing her alignments and relationships to people in her world.49 Thus,
nonconsensual sex without force can cause many of the same long-term effects
as forcible nonconsensual intercourse. In this respect, sexual violations are often
different and more serious than other transgressions (such as stealing property
from a victim) because “[i]n sexual interactions, unlike other interactions, it is
even more important that we are able to control whom we are intimate with,
since sexual relationships expose us more than other relationships and thereby
make us more vulnerable.”50
[https://perm.cc/6QD8-RB4C]; Not Alone: The First Report of the White House Task Force To
Protect Students from Sexual Assault, White House 6–8 (April 2014).
45 Deborah L. Brake, Back to Basics: Excavating the Sex Discrimination Roots of Campus Sexual
Assault, 6 TENN. J. RACE, GENDER & SOCIAL JUSTICE 7, 32 (2017).
46 Id.
47 See Sofi Sinozich & Lynn Langton, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMIZATION AMONG COLLEGE-AGE FEMALES, –, at 4
(finding that women aged eighteen to twenty-four who were not college students were 1.2 times
more likely to be sexually violated than women of the same age in college).
48 Lynne Henderson, Getting to Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 Tex. J. Women &
Law 42, 58, 64–65 (1993); Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond
Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442, 1448 (1993).
49 See Martha Chamallas, Lucky: The Sequel, 80 IND. L.J. 441, 468–471 (2005).
50 MCGREGOR, supra note 20, at 225.
The Elephant in the Room 13
Brought to you by | De Gruyter / TCS
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/11/18 5:49 PM
To be clear, establishing that there is a high level of acquaintance rape and
sexual assault and that such conduct may cause serious harm does not mean
that every allegation of rape or sexual assault is true or that there is little or no
countervailing risk of imposing liability or blame on an innocent defendant in
individual cases. As one university administrator put it, even in an era known
for its “hook up” culture and destigmatizing of casual sex, some women may
still falsely accuse men of sexual misconduct not only out of vindictiveness, but
because they live in world where women continue to be shamed for engaging in
sexual activity. We cannot be entirely sure that a charge of sexual violation is
warranted and not brought to “vindicate honor, provide safety from a third
party, reinforce identities of sexual innocence, protect against jealousy, or
protect [the claimant] from falling from someone’s grace.”51 In my view, how-
ever, the balance of risks and equities still quite clearly points toward doing
more, not less, to protect against sexual abuse, making affirmative consent
worthy of serious consideration, especially in the context of tort law.
I find three rationales for adopting affirmative consent most compelling.
First, adoption of some version of affirmative consent is needed because many
women still react passively or are silent in the face of sexual aggression, even
when they do not desire to have sex and would not have initiated the sexual
activity. By now, we know that there are many explanations for failing to resist
or register a verbal objection to sexual activity other than tacit consent. The
target may be afraid (“frozen in fear”), intimidated by the defendant’s physical
strength or confident demeanor, socialized not to react aggressively, but rather
to cry or act in “feminine,” less decisive ways. She may be socially awkward or
inexperienced and ashamed to reveal her lack of sophistication and under-
standing of sexual matters. She may be worn down by defendant’s persistent
attempts and finally give in because she lacks the kind of self-esteem that would
allow her to place her own wishes ahead of others. Or she may simply be
conflicted, unsure of whether she wants really wants to continue. If her choice
is taken away by a man who “takes the initiative” and acts without her permis-
sion, that ought to count as a legal injury, especially if the law places equal
weight on the sexual autonomy of each partner. In matters of sex and intimacy,
there can be little question that the law rightly prioritizes the right to deny or
refuse a relationship over the desire to enter into a relationship.52
51 Joan W. Howarth, Shame Agent, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 717, 722 (2017).
52 See Kenneth Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE J. J. 624, 637–638 (1980)
(“as rape and unwanted pregnancy dramatically illustrate … coerced intimate associations are
the most repugnant of all forms of compulsory associations”).
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Second, affirmative consent is needed as a corrective to ensure that the
perspective and experience of victims are taken into account and given due
weight under the law. The traditional criminal law has been criticized for
embracing a defendant-oriented male perspective in judging consent. For exam-
ple, the resistance requirement can no longer plausibly be viewed as a standard
based on how women actually responded to the threat of rape. Instead it
required women to fight back in a way that men imagined that they might
react to an assault. The conquest model of sexuality, although accepted as
reality by some women, is a male-oriented model that serves to perpetuate
and justify aggressive masculinity. It is well established that when it comes to
sexual encounters, men and women often have different perspectives, with
competing scripts structured predictably along gender lines.53 Social science
research indicates that men tend to interpret women’s behavior in a sexualized
way, seeing seductiveness and sexual receptivity, while women are more likely
to interpret their behavior in a non-sexual way, e. g., as being friendly, cautious,
or even unreceptive.54 Particularly when the meaning of nonverbal behavior is
in question, the potential for misinterpreting “cues” is great. Given the historical
privileging of the male perspective, affirmative consent’s insistence that men
who initiate sexual activity first check to determine whether their interpretation
of plaintiff’s conduct is right helps to prevent rape myths from filling in the gaps
when actions are ambiguous or carry different meanings. Particularly the “stop
and ask” formulations of affirmative consent send a message that the law seeks
to protect the sexual autonomy of both parties by building in safeguards against
overreaching, willful blindness, or sincere (but harmful) mistakes.
Third, affirmative consent is needed to ensure that women’s interests in
bodily integrity and sexual autonomy are accorded the status they deserve, on
par with other fundamental interests. Both criminal law and tort law purport to
place a very high weight on these interests, equal to or above interests in
property. However, in many respects, sexual conduct continues to be treated
exceptionally. Traditional criminal law permitted a finding of a victim’s con-
sent in sexual conduct cases – from silence, from lack of resistance, from lack
of protest – even though the law would not countenance such a finding in
analogous cases involving theft of property. As Susan Estrich has argued, the
53 Kim Lane Scheppele, The Re-Vision of Rape Law, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1095, 1104–1105 (1987).
54 For a discussions of this “two worlds” phenomenon in the context of sexual harassment, see
Barbara A. Gutek, Understanding Sexual Harassment at Work, 6 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 335, 343 (1992); Elizabeth L. Schoenfelt, Allison E. Maue & JoAnn Nelson, Reasonable
Person versus Reasonable Woman: Does It Matter? 10 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC., POL’Y & L. 633,
647–651 (2002).
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law does not regard a victim as consenting to robbery when the assailant pins
her down, strides atop her, and steals her wallet, even if the victim fails to yell
“stop.”55 It should not be enough to say that sexual conduct is different
because social norms dictate that consent is often given tacitly – through
body language and other nonverbal means – when those social norms are
highly contested and historically skewed against one group. Nor is sex differ-
ent because consent has the potential to transform an injury into a pleasurable
(or at least non-injurious) experience. This transformative property of consent
is present in other contexts as well when, for example, consent transforms
theft into a gift. Context may be all-important, but it is important to have a
thorough, not one-sided, understanding of the context. Overall, adoption of
affirmative consent would eliminate the presumption of consent that often
arises in sexual conduct cases, even when there is no convincing evidence
that the plaintiff gave permission to the defendant to invade the boundaries of
her body.
3 Consent and civil rights
The movement toward affirmative consent was foreshowed by developments
under the civil rights laws that embody critiques of the traditional criminal
law approach to consent and provide a model for reform. Both Title VII and
Title IX doctrine have been re-shaped to provide a more robust concept of
consent and to jettison the baggage of the criminal law. The impetus for change
under both anti-discrimination statutes was to provide greater protection for
women and other victims of sexual assault and sexually abusive conduct.
The first inroad came in sexual harassment cases under Title VII. Convinced
that tort law was hopelessly retrograde, Catharine MacKinnon and other feminist
activists employed a strategy to provide a measure of protection to women by re-
conceptualizing sexual abuse as a civil rights violation. Significantly, the first
sexual harassment case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court dealt with consent and
rejected the criminal law version of the concept. The plaintiff in Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson56 alleged that she had been coerced into having sexual inter-
course with her supervisor on multiple occasions, fearing that unless she gave
into his demands she would lose her job. Notably, the supervisor never used
physical force or the threat of physical force to obtain plaintiff’s submission.
55 SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 59 (1987).
56 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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Sitting as a factfinder, the trial court in Meritor Savings Bank ruled in favor
of the defendant, finding that any relationship between plaintiff and her super-
visor was “voluntary” and could not qualify as harassment under Title VII. In a
crucial move that paved the way for sexual harassment claims to become a
staple of Title VII law, the Supreme Court rejected any notion of voluntariness or
consent in the determination of what qualifies as harassment, declaring that
“voluntariness” in the sense of consent is not a defense to such a claim.”57 In the
place of consent, the Court adopted the concept of “unwelcomeness” to deter-
mine whether sexual conduct amounted to harassment and suggested that
unwelcomeness would turn, at least in part, on whether the target of the
harassment “found particular advances unwelcome.”58
Admittedly, Meritor Bank’s adoption of an unwelcomeness standard is not
the same as imposing a requirement of affirmative consent. Indeed, the Court in
a later, widely criticized portion of the same case, ruled that a target’s “provo-
cative speech or dress” was “obviously relevant” to determining whether sexual
advances were unwelcome,59 seeming to depart from the subjective, “mental-
state-of-the- plaintiff” connotation of term “unwelcome.” However, for our pur-
poses, what is significant is the Court’s move away from traditional consent in
Meritor Bank and its attempt to devise a more protective standard that acknowl-
edges the significance of power disparities between the initiator of sexual
conduct and the target. In this respect, unwelcomeness can be looked upon as
a more robust version of consent, one which refuses to find consent in instances
in which the plaintiff submits or accedes to undesired sex out of concern for
retaining her job.
By adopting the new concept of unwelcomeness, moreover, the Court made
it easier for factfinders to consider the conduct in question from the victim’s
perspective, asking them to imagine whether the target desired or welcomed the
advances or conduct. Although the Supreme Court has never ruled that the
victim’s perspective is determinative in Title VII cases,60 the very recognition
of the claim of sexual harassment stems from a shift in cultural awareness, i. e.,
from seeing sexualized conduct in the workplace as mere casual banter, teasing
or flirtation to judging the same conduct as harassing, abusive or hostile. This
57 Id. at 69.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 See Martha Chamallas, Gaining Some Perspective in Tort Law: A New Take on Third-Party
Criminal Attack Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1351, 1367–1369 (2010) (discussing victim’s
perspective in Title VII cases).
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cultural shift gives weight to the target’s perspective and recognizes the poten-
tial for misinterpreting silence or passivity as consent.
Importantly, when the Supreme Court recognized sexual harassment as a
Title VII violation in 1986 the language of Title VII had not been amended, nor
could it be said that there was a clear cultural consensus or established social
norm making sexual harassment in the workplace unacceptable. Instead, given
contested cultural views, the Court opted for an interpretation of Title VII that
best served the purposes of Title VII, namely, promoting equal employment
opportunity for women. Outside the Title VII context, Meritor Savings Bank is
noteworthy for its determination that consent or acquiescence induced by the
economic pressure or coercion from threatened job loss should not be regarded
as effective consent, at least not in the context of civil litigation. While this
narrow determination certainly has relevance for intentional torts claims, it is
important not to lose sight of Meritor Bank’s broader critique of consent and the
potential of civil rights law to provide a model for reform of the tort doctrine of
consent.
While Title VII addressed victims’ responses to sexual conduct, it did not
directly confront the problem of acquaintance rape outside the context of
employment. Adoption of an affirmative consent standard in acquaintance
rape cases did not gain momentum until the Obama-era initiative to curb sexual
violence on college campuses, often marked by the “Dear Colleague” Letter
issued by the Office of Civil Rights, Department of Education (“OCR”) to college
and universities in 2011.61 The “Dear Colleague” Letter dealt mainly with proce-
dures for adjudicating complaints of sex abuse by college disciplinary autho-
rities and did not directly mandate that educational institutions adopt
affirmative consent standards. However, as enforcement of Title IX intensified
and OCR opened sexual violence investigations against more than 120 colleges
and universities,62 educational institutions rapidly adopted affirmative consent
rules, resulting in more than 1400 such adoptions across the country.63
Incorporating affirmative consent into disciplinary codes was often accompa-
nied by stepped-up educational programming, training and seminars, accelerat-
ing a culture change in the meaning of consent that had been simmering for
quite some time.
61 Office of Civil Rights, Dear Colleague Letter from Assistant Secretary Russlynn Ali, U.S. Dep’t
of Educ. (4th April 2011).
62 See Michelle J. Anderson, Campus Sexual Assault Adjudication and Resistance to Reform. 125
YALE L. J. 1940, 1975 (2016), citing Tyler Kingkade, 124 Colleges, 40 School Districts Under
Investigation for Handling Sexual Assault, HUFFINGTON POST (24th July 2014).
63 Sandy Keenan, Affirmative Consent: Are Students Really Asking?, N. Y. TIMES (28th July 2015).
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An important aspect of the Title IX story is that it was spearheaded by a
grassroots social movement of college women, including victims of sexual
assault, who charged that acquaintance rape was widespread on their cam-
puses and that their institutions ignored, minimized or otherwise failed to
respond equitably to complaints. While the anti-rape activists of the 1970s
had set their sights on the “force” requirement and on ridding the criminal
law of special rules that made rape particularly difficult to prosecute, contem-
porary college activists turned their attention to transforming the meaning of
consent as it affected sexual interactions with their peers and fixed on the civil
and institutional side of law enforcement. No one knows whether the cultural
changes they brought about are so deeply rooted that they will survive the
powerful backlash forces currently in play, including any Trump administra-
tion pull back in Title IX enforcement. However, the Title IX affirmative con-
sent movement has already produced good examples and definitions of
affirmative consent that can serve as models for drafting Restatement
provisions.
For example, in addition to the California statute, discussed previously, a
New York statute mandating that college and universities in that state adopt
affirmative consent defines affirmative consent as “a knowing, voluntary, and
mutual decision among all participants to engage in sexual activity.”64 It
further specifies that “consent can be given by words or actions, as long as
those words or actions create clear permission regarding willingness to engage
in the sexual activity.” Like the California statute, the New York law explicitly
states that “[s]ilence or lack of resistance, in and of itself does not demonstrate
consent” and additionally provides that “[t]he definition of consent does not
vary based upon the participant’s sex, sexual orientation, gender identity or
gender expression.”
The New York statute is somewhat different from the California statute,
discussed earlier,65 in that it does not specify that affirmative consent must be
ongoing and does not mention that a prior dating or sexual relationship between
the parties is not in and of itself an indicator of consent. Moreover, the New York
statute makes it clear that affirmative consent may be given by actions as well as
words, while the California statute is silent on that point. But the two statutory
formulations are fundamentally similar. They each envision affirmative consent
as a mutual obligation, imposing a duty on each party to make sure that he or
she has the permission of the other to engage in the sexual conduct. They each
refuse to equate silence and passivity with consent. And they each recognize the
64 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6441 (McKinney 2015).
65 See supra note 19.
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perspective of the victim or target by making consent turn on a target’s words or
actions, rather than solely on a defendant’s or a hypothetical reasonable per-
son’s interpretation of events.
The Title IX model of affirmative consent is sufficiently developed to make it
ripe for consideration under tort law. It was shaped to respond to acquaintance
rape and other kinds of sexual assault by non-strangers, a common occurrence
that tort law has addressed and clearly should address. Under Title IX, a finding
of sexual misconduct gives rise to a civil sanction (i. e., discipline of the offend-
ing student), separate and apart from criminal law, and may result in relief to
individual victims (e. g., issuance of no-contact order, accommodations with
respect to class attendance, etc.). Keeping these similarities in mind, the follow-
ing sections turn to the Restatement (Third) and how it handles consent in
intentional tort sexual misconduct cases.
4 Approach of the restatement
Two key Restatement provisions defining actual consent (§13) and apparent
consent (§16) are most relevant to our discussion of affirmative consent. They
contain the general standards for a finding of consent and largely retain the
traditional definitions of these concepts found in earlier Restatements.
Additionally, the new Restatement departs from its predecessor in providing
that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish the absence of actual
consent. It takes no position with respect to allocation of the burden of proof in
apparent consent cases. The following discussion parses the Restatement’s
“blackletter” provisions on consent, noting references to affirmative consent
and other relevant statements in the commentary and Reporters’ Notes.
4.1 Actual consent
Section 13 defining actual consent states that “[a] person actually consents to an
actor’s otherwise tortious behavior if the person is subjectively willing for that
conduct to occur. Such consent can be express or can be inferred from the facts.
Actual consent ordinarily is, but need not be communicated to the actor.”66 This
provision embraces a “mental state” approach to consent and finds consent
even in rare instances in which a person desires to engage in an act but has
66 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 13(a).
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given no indication to the defendant that he has her permission to act. A quaint
scenario, seemingly patterned on a party attended by adolescents, is offered to
demonstrate that “actual consent need not be communicated to the actor.”67 The
Illustration explains that “B, while attending a party, confides to his best friend
that he is very attracted to A and would like very much to kiss her, but he has
been afraid to express his feelings to her or to make the first move. Unknown to
B, A is at the party. On a dare from a friend, she suddenly walks up to B and
kisses him, before he has any chance to respond. A is not liable to B.” The
surprise kiss in the illustration is consensual, according to the Restatement,
because B is “willing to permit” what occurred, in this instance equating B’s
sexual attraction or desire with willingness. We are not told whether someone in
B’s position might have misgivings about not making the “first move,” or being
made the object of a dare, presumably because, in the Illustration, B just wants
the kiss and has no other desires.
More importantly for our purposes, in the run-of-the-mill cases not involving
uncommunicated consent, the Restatement’s definition of actual consent turns
out to be a very thin concept that need not reflect a party’s sexual or romantic
desires. The commentary indicates that consent is synonymous with “subjective
willingness,” defined further as “assent or acquiesce[ence] to the actor’s conduct
or invasion.”68 We are told that effective consent can be given reluctantly, as
illustrated by an example of an individual who reluctantly agrees to have
intercourse with her partner when the partner threatens to break off the relation-
ship. The “willingness” that is the touchstone of actual consent, moreover, need
not be given expressly and can be inferred from the plaintiff’s conduct as well as
her words.
The Reporters are aware that the thin version of actual consent adopted in
Section 13 is in tension with affirmative consent. In the commentary to Section
13, they state that a state court or legislature might in “special circumstances”
require “a more robust type of consent,” noting that “consent to sexual inter-
course might require more than the willingness of both parties to engage in that
conduct.”69 The commentary goes on to mention that the criminal law in some
states requires proof of affirmative consent and that “[t]his standard might be
adopted in tort cases as well.”70 The implication here is that a state might want
to follow its criminal law on this issue. One can also discern a negative implica-
tion in the comment, i. e., that there is no warrant for adopting affirmative
67 Id. at § 13, illus. 4.
68 Id. at § 13, cmt. b.
69 Id. at § 13, cmt. g.
70 Id.
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consent in tort cases involving sexual conduct in the vast majority of states that
have not adopted an affirmative consent standard in their criminal law.
In the Reporters’ Note to Section 13, the Reporters create additional distance
between affirmative consent and the requisites of actual consent under Section 13
by disputing a “famous hypothetical” offered by Steven Schulhofer.71 The hypothe-
tical involves an athlete who is “ambivalent about whether to undergo surgery
when the surgeon asks for his consent.” Schulhofer argues that we would not treat
the athlete as consenting to the operation if the surgeon proceeded with adminis-
tering anesthesia, “despite the athlete’s silence or ambiguous attitude” and that it
is likewise “unjustifiable to treat silence or an ambiguous attitude in response to a
request for sexual intercourse as consent to that conduct.” The Reporters reply that
the medical hypothetical can be distinguished from a case involving consent to
sexual intercourse because “willingness is often more plausibly inferred from a
course of sexual conduct, even absent express words or conduct, than from an
ambiguous response to a doctor’s question whether one wishes to undergo sur-
gery.”72 In that statement, the Reporters seem to endorse a finding of actual
consent, even in the absence of “express words or conduct” signaling such con-
sent, thereby suggesting that silence and ambiguous conduct can legitimately be
interpreted as actual consent. They also endorse different or exceptional treatment
of sexual conduct cases, as compared to medical consent cases.
4.2 Apparent consent
Aside from the definition of actual consent, the Restatement departs from
affirmative consent by its endorsement of apparent consent in § 16. That section
provides that “an actor is not liable to another if a reasonable person in the
position of the actor would believe that the other actually consents to the actor’s
otherwise tortious intentional conduct.”73 Under this definition, apparent con-
sent turns on the defendant’s interpretation of the plaintiff’s mental state, by
first instructing that we view events from a person in the position of the actor/
defendant, and then asking whether that interpretation is reasonable. The
commentary indicates that in making determinations of reasonableness, “the
customs of the community” are highly relevant, particularly in cases of “silence
71 Id. at § 13, Rptrs. Note, cmt. g, citing Steven Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously, 11
LAW & PHIL. 35 (1992).
72 Id.
73 Id. at § 16.
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and inaction.”74 Without mentioning the problem of contested norms and differ-
ing perspectives, the commentary contends that it is fair to allow defendants to
rely on “reasonable appearances” and that it is fair to require the non-initiating
party to register an objection, arguing that “[a] person who objects to the
behavior of an actor that most other persons find unobjectionable or desirable
often retains the ability to express that objection and thus to deny the applica-
tion of apparent consent.”75
The Restatement’s commentary on apparent consent makes it clear that it is
the defendant’s interpretation of events that matters (provided it is judged to be
reasonable) and that it is fair to exclude the perspective of the plaintiff. It is
especially noteworthy that the Restatement takes the position that the defen-
dant’s reasonable belief need not be based on the words or affirmative conduct
of the plaintiff.76 According to the Restatement, a defendant is entitled to rely on
“customary norms” or other reasonable assumptions in making his assessment
about whether plaintiff consented. Further, such a defendant is characterized as
acting “without fault” if he proceeds without stopping and asking for permis-
sion. Remarkably, there is no discussion in the commentary about whether the
basic concept of apparent consent is inconsistent with affirmative consent or
whether states might choose to abandon apparent consent in favor of affirmative
consent in sexual conduct cases.
The commentary on apparent consent does, however, directly address sex-
ual conduct cases in comment (f), in connection with a discussion about evol-
ving norms. It first notes that the Restatement’s section on battery (§3) declares
that “any nonconsensual contact with a sexual purpose” offends a reasonable
sense of personal dignity and acknowledges that whether sexual conduct is
nonconsensual is “thus a critically important question in determining whether
the actor has committed an offensive battery.”77 Rather than grappling with
contested norms and the differing perspectives of men and women, however,
the Restatement relies on evolution in the meaning of reasonableness to reach
the right result, stating that “[a]s social norms about acceptable sexual behavior
evolve, the meaning of ‘reasonable’ belief that the plaintiff was willing for the
sexual contact to occur must adapt to that evolution.”78 The commentary then
proceeds to endorse a “no means no” approach to sexual conduct, stating that
74 Id. at § 16, cmt. b.
75 Id.
76 Id. at § 16, cmt. c.
77 Id. at § 16, cmt f.
78 Id.
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“if plaintiff expresses his or her objection to any sexual act, the actor cannot rely
upon plaintiff’s apparent consent.”79
The commentary on apparent consent concludes with a confusing Illustration
that directly confronts the problem of differing perspectives in an acquaintance
rape scenario.80 We are asked to imagine a situation where E and F are “on a first
date.” After kissing, “E and F disrobe” and “E asks F if F is willing to engage in
sexual intercourse.” We are told that “[a]lthough inwardly objecting, F says
nothing and does not express unwillingness by words or conduct.” Presumably
in such a case the doctrine of apparent consent would permit E to penetrate the
unwilling F if E reasonably believes that F has consented. The Illustration con-
cludes by stating that “[w]hether E is justified in relying on F’s apparent consent
depends on the jurisdiction’s norms with respect to consent to sexual intercourse.
If those norms provide that a reasonable person in E’s position should not treat
F’s conduct as consensual unless F has affirmatively expressed willingness, then
E many not rely on apparent consent, and E is subject to liability to F for battery.”
The Illustration thus appears to leave room for a jurisdiction to smuggle a
version of affirmative consent into apparent consent, provided affirmative con-
sent is embodied in the “norms” of that particular jurisdiction. As I read the
Illustration, apparent consent is negated because in such a jurisdiction it would
no longer be reasonable for a defendant to interpret a plaintiff’s silence and
passivity as consent. Although the Illustration does not specify where a court
should go to find the source of the jurisdiction’s norms, the Reporters’ Note
suggests that the norms referred to in the Illustration are norms gleaned from
the state’s criminal law.81 If my reading is correct, then it is important to
recognize that the Illustration also suggests that in the vast majority of states
that have not adopted affirmative consent in their criminal law, E presumably
may reasonably interpret F’s silence and passivity as consent. In this respect, the
Illustration of apparent consent is consistent with the commentary on actual
consent in that each defers to a state’s criminal law to determine the standard
for consent in tort cases.
4.3 Burden of proof
Perhaps the most noticeable aspect of the new Restatement’s provisions on
consent is its assignment of the burden of proof. The Restatement attempts to
79 Id.
80 Id. at § 16, illus. 11.
81 Id. at § 16, Rptrs Note, cmt. f.
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clear up confusion in the case law by assigning the burden to plaintiffs to prove
their absence of consent with respect to actual consent.82 The commentary
explains that because the plaintiff “ordinarily has greater access to the facts
relevant to actual consent,” it is “both fair and efficient to require plaintiff to
demonstrate absence of consent as part of his or her prima facie case.”83 It
downplays the significance of placing the burden of proving a negative on the
plaintiff, indicating that if plaintiffs must testify on the issue of consent in
contested cases, “then it usually will not matter which party has the burden of
production, and it frequently will not matter which has the burden of
persuasion.”84
The commentary considers, and seemingly rejects, shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant in cases involving sexual conduct. The commentary notes
that some criminal-law rules and student disciplinary standards require affirma-
tive consent and that “[o]n one understanding, affirmative consent shifts the
burden of persuasion to the actor initiating the intercourse to show that his or
her partner actually consented to this level of intimacy.”85 However, later in the
Reporters’ Note, they remark that if states wish to adopt affirmative consent,
they may do so without shifting the burden of consent to the defendant. In their
view, “even if plaintiff is required to prove the absence of such [affirmative]
consent, discharging that burden only requires plaintiff to prove that he or she
did not express affirmative permission by words or conduct. If plaintiff shows
that the circumstances were ambiguous, with no such expression of permission,
plaintiff succeeds in showing the absence of “consent,” so defined.”86 Through
this ingenious interpretation, the substantive obligation to assure that one’s
sexual partner has given affirmative consent is severed from the assignment of
the burden of proof, assigning the proof burden not to the party who initiated
the sexual conduct but to the target of the conduct.
To be fair, the commentary displays some concern about assigning the
burden to the plaintiff to prove lack of actual consent in sexual conduct cases.
It acknowledges that assigning the burden to the defendant might have the
advantage of encouraging those who initiate sexual conduct “to be quite certain”
that the other party genuinely consents and notes that it would “ease the burden
82 The language specifying that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff is found in the
definitions of each of the intentional torts. See § 1, cmt. f (battery); § 4, cmt. d (purposeful
infliction of bodily harm); § 5, cmt. j (assault); § 7, comment k (false imprisonment).
83 Id. at § 12, cmt. d.
84 Id.
85 Id. at § 12, cmt. d.
86 Id. at § 12, Rptrs. Note, cmt. d.
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on plaintiffs to prove sexual battery where physical evidence of violation is
difficult or impossible to produce.”87 Perhaps most significantly, the commentary
recognizes the social impact of assigning the burden of proof to the plaintiff,
rather than to the defendant, in light of the “overwhelming evidence of the
frequency of sexual assault and the relative infrequency of successful tort recov-
ery.”88 Nevertheless, because the commentary finds no support in the case law for
assigning the burden to the defendant, these concerns do not carry the day.
With respect to assignment of the burden of proof in cases of apparent consent,
the Restatement has little to offer and it says nothing about affirmative consent. For
“simplicity” sake, the Reporters suggest, the burden of proof should be assigned to
the plaintiff, to parallel the assignment in actual consent cases.89 On the other
hand, they acknowledge that a defendant will “normally have significantly greater
access to the relevant evidence than will the plaintiff” and they ultimately decide to
leave the question to “judicial development.”90 This means that plaintiffs in sexual
conduct cases may be saddled with the burden of disproving that the defendant
reasonably believed that she had consented, i. e., that a plaintiff will have to prove
that defendant’s interpretation of events was unreasonable, all the while taking the
defendant’s perception of events as controlling.
5 The restatement’s incompatibility with
affirmative consent
As the foregoing description suggests, each of the three aspects of consent
discussed above – the substantive definitions of actual and apparent consent
and the placement of the burden of proof – are in tension with affirmative
consent. Despite the efforts of the Reporters to carve out room for individual
states to adopt affirmative consent in sexual conduct cases, I fear that the
structure of the new Restatement’s provisions are fundamentally incompatible
with the basic concept of affirmative consent and could serve to deter states
from adopting affirmative consent in sexual battery cases. To put it most
succinctly, the conception of consent embedded in the Restatement’s defini-
tion of actual consent is too thin to capture the affirmative duty of a sexual
partner to secure permission from the other that is a hallmark of affirmative
87 Id. at § 12, cmt. d.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
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consent. The Restatement’s definition of apparent consent fundamentally
departs from affirmative consent’s commitment to recognizing the perspective
of the victim and allows too much leeway for defendants to interpret plaintiff’s
silence or ambiguous conduct as consent. And placing the burden of proof on
the plaintiff to prove her lack of consent in actual consent cases (and possibly
even apparent consent cases) has the tendency to revive the traditional crim-
inal law approach that often presumed a victim’s consent in sexual assault
cases and required proof of her active resistance to counteract the
presumption.
5.1 Actual consent
To elaborate somewhat, the thin concept of actual consent in the Restatement
allows a finding of consent when the plaintiff merely acquiesces in or
reluctantly submits to a defendant’s aggressive conduct. Although the
Restatement’s notion of consent purportedly turns on the plaintiff’s mental
state, the mental state required to declare sexual conduct “consensual” is a
far cry from requiring evidence of a plaintiff’s actual desire to have sex, in
the sense that one could say that the plaintiff would have initiated the
contact had the defendant not done so first. This thin concept of consent
may be satisfied in cases where plaintiff responds passively but cannot
realistically be said to have agreed to defendant’s behavior, for example, in
cases in which a plaintiff is worn down by defendant’s persistent overtures
and merely gives up and gives in. Finding consent in such a case hardly
serves to reinforce the sexual autonomy or self-determination of plaintiffs and
mainly mimics a “sexual conquest” model of sexuality,91 rewarding the more
powerful and aggressive party. Moreover, this thin version of consent can
arise from a plaintiff’s conduct as well as her words and, as Schulhofer’s
athlete and the surgeon hypothetical teaches us,92 permits a finding of con-
sent in cases of silence and ambiguous conduct. Presuming consent from
silence or in ambiguous circumstances goes sharply against the grain of
affirmative consent which seeks to counteract the traditional criminal law’s
penchant for presuming consent in such circumstances. Finally, because the
Restatement allows even unexpressed, uncommunicated desire to qualify as
consent, it is at odds with a performative conception of affirmative consent
that requires a plaintiff to give her permission before a defendant is entitled
91 See supra at note 34.
92 See supra at note 71.
The Elephant in the Room 27
Brought to you by | De Gruyter / TCS
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/11/18 5:49 PM
to act, even if she is sexually attracted to the defendant or otherwise might
be said to have desired his conduct.
5.2 Apparent consent
Even more pointedly, the Restatement’s endorsement of apparent consent in
sexual conduct cases cannot be squared with any version of affirmative consent.
To establish apparent consent, all that must be proven is that “a reasonable
person in the position of the actor” would have believed that plaintiff consented.
The Restatement opts for an interpretation of apparent consent that allows the
factfinders to find apparent consent even when defendant’s belief does not stem
from the plaintiff’s own words or actions. This definition leaves the door wide
open for a defendant to interpret a plaintiff’s silence or passivity as consent,
allowing rape myths and tire-worn, insidious cultural beliefs about women’s
supposed desires and the meaning of women’s responses to fill in the silence.
The Restatement’s definition of apparent consent also explicitly endorses
the perpetrator’s or defendant’s perspective. We are instructed to evaluate the
situation from the perspective of a reasonable person in the position of the actor,
namely, to ask how a reasonable defendant would interpret events, excluding
the plaintiff’s perspective in the process. Particularly when it comes to interpret-
ing sexual behavior – where there are frequently differing perspectives and
misunderstandings – the doctrine of apparent consent seems to come down on
the side of the defendant. In doing so, the law affords greater weight to the
potential cost of holding an “honest” (but oblivious or mistaken) defendant
civilly liable than it does the cost of denying recovery to a plaintiff who has
been sexually violated. This balancing of interests reverses the usual priority of
interests by upsetting the principle that a person’s right or desire to enter into an
intimate relationship is outweighed by the right of a person to deny or refuse an
intimate relationship. Although the interest in promoting consensual sexual
relationships may be a legitimate one, it should be subordinated to the risk of
legitimating or facilitating nonconsensual encounters. Finally, when sexual
encounters are labeled “consensual” due to the operation of the apparent
consent doctrine, it tends to normalize non-consensual sex, at least if we
measure consent in part by the target’s perspective and desires.
With respect to apparent consent, I do not believe that social norms will
simply “evolve”93 and that someday (or in some jurisdictions), a consensus will
develop that makes it “unreasonable” for a defendant to fail to secure the
93 RESTATEMENT, § 16, cmt. f.
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affirmative consent of a sexual partner. Instead, the meaning of consent is likely
to remain contested and tort law will be called upon to make a choice between
competing norms and perspectives. In my view, affirmative consent cannot
easily be smuggled into the doctrine of apparent consent through evolving
concepts of “reasonableness.”
5.3 Burden of proof
Aside from the substantive definitions of actual and apparent consent, the
Restatement’s placement of the burden of proof in consent cases is at odds
with affirmative consent. Placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove
her lack of actual consent is inconsistent with a core feature of affirmative
consent, namely, that it is the duty of the initiator of sexual conduct to make
sure that the plaintiff consents to what would otherwise be tortious conduct. It is
awkward to place the burden of proof on a party owed an obligation, rather than
on an actor who is under an obligation. Once we accept that affirmative consent
imposes an obligation, we can see also that the defendant is in the best position
to offer proof that he discharged his duty, although plaintiff, of course, may
contest defendant’s evidence. In such cases, characterizing defendant’s burden
as establishing an affirmative defense seems appropriate, given that a presump-
tive invasion of plaintiff’s interests has occurred. Placing the burden of proof on
the plaintiff, on the other hand, seems to presume consent and is reminiscent of
consent presumptions in traditional criminal law.
In sexual conduct cases, moreover, I disagree with the proposition stated in
the commentary that it “frequently will not matter which party has the burden of
persuasion.”94 Indeed, in acquaintance rape and other sexual misconduct cases,
parties often give conflicting testimony (“he said, she said”) and the outcome
may well depend upon the burden of proof. If the plaintiff is saddled with the
burden of proving that she did not consent, it is a smaller step for a juror to
imagine that because the plaintiff did not offer resistance (either physical or
verbal), the defendant should prevail. Although assignment of the burden of
proof does not technically reinstate the resistance requirement, I fear that,
absent evidence of resistance, a plaintiff will find it difficult to convince the
factfinder that she did not consent, even if a jurisdiction were to adopt a version
of affirmative consent.
Finally, imposing a burden of proof on the plaintiff in apparent consent
cases seems hostile to any notion of affirmative consent. If the plaintiff must
94 RESTATEMENT, § 12, cmt. d.
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prove that the defendant was unreasonable in believing that she consented –
from the perspective of a person in the position of the defendant – the plaintiff is
not likely to shoulder that burden simply by claiming that she was silent or
passive or otherwise did not affirmatively consent. The whole point of apparent
consent seems aimed at giving controlling weight to a defendant’s interpretation
of a plaintiff’s silence or ambiguous conduct, making it extremely difficult for
plaintiff to prove otherwise. Because the concepts of apparent consent and
affirmative consent are antithetical, placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff
to prove lack of consent in apparent consent cases only exacerbates the tension.
6 Finding room for affirmative consent in the
restatement
If affirmative consent is indeed incompatible with the draft consent provisions of
the Restatement, there remains the question of whether the Restatement could
embrace affirmative consent, consistent with the Restatement’s mission to
“reflect the law as it presently stands or might appropriately be stated by a
court.”95 As a special type of law reform project, the Restatement must generally
respect controlling case law and majority views. However, where there is little
precedent directly on point, the Restatement is free to look to “policy, principle,
and coherence with the broader body of law” and determine what principle “fits
best with the broader body of law.”96
With respect to consent in sexual conduct cases, there appears to be very
little case law at all and thus no real constraints on fashioning an appropriate
rule that fits best with the broader body of law. Compared to other Restatement
projects, such as the Restatement on Liability for Physical and Emotional
Harm, there are far fewer intentional tort cases to analyze, as reflected in the
discussion of cases in the Reporters’ Notes, which are largely devoted to
medical consent cases. Of course, one could strive to be consistent and apply
the same rules in medical consent and sexual conduct cases. Such a superficial
consistency in treatment, however, may be misleading, given that patients in
the medical consent cases are also afforded very broad protection by the
negligence doctrine of informed consent. Importantly, there is no parallel
negligence doctrine of informed consent protecting plaintiffs in sexual conduct
95 RESTATEMENT (excerpts of the Revised Style Manual approved by the ALI Council in January
2015), at p. x-xi.
96 Id.
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cases, unless, of course, we regard affirmative consent as a kind of informed
consent. My point here is that attempting to fashion general rules on consent to
govern all intentional tort cases is very tricky if based only on a limited set of
cases (i. e., medical cases, sexual conduct cases and athletic injuries) that each
has distinctive features.
With respect to actual consent, the Reporters’ Notes indicate that there are
no cases on whether consent must be communicated97 and they cite to no tort
cases for the main proposition that a party’s mere willingness or acquiescence
suffices to establish actual consent in sexual conduct cases in which the plaintiff
is silent or passive.
With respect to apparent consent, the only sexual conduct case cited is Reavis
v. Slominski,98 a confusing 1996 decision by a badly split Nebraska Supreme Court.
Reavis is essentially a sexual harassment case in which a plaintiff alleged that she
was sexually assaulted by her employer. The case produced five separate opinions
and much of the discussion centered on whether plaintiff’s fear of losing her job
was sufficient duress to render her consent ineffective and whether plaintiff’s
history of sexual abuse as a child affected her capacity to consent. It is true that
the trial judge in that case instructed the jury on actual and apparent consent,
tracking the Restatement’s definitions of consent, and neither the supreme court,
nor the parties, objected to the definitions. However, the court ultimately reversed
a jury verdict for the plaintiff, ruling that a new trial was necessary because the
jury instructions on whether plaintiff’s consent was effective were erroneous. In
my view, Reavis does not qualify as controlling precedent. It is an isolated case
that did not turn on the proper definition of actual and apparent consent. It thus
leaves plenty of room for adoption of a different definition of consent that fits
better with the “broader body of law.”
Given the lack of controlling precedent, the key question becomes which
body of law the Restatement should turn to as a model for tort law. Judging from
the multiple references to the new draft provisions of the Model Penal Code in
the Restatement commentary and the Reporters’ Notes, the answer seems to be
that the Restatement is following the path of the criminal law, rather than
turning to civil rights law and Title IX. With respect to the law of consent, that
choice is critical. As we have seen, there is a move to embrace affirmative
consent in civil rights law, while the criminal law has been resistant to such a
move and is only now beginning to adopt a “no means no” approach to consent.
I realize that relying on the criminal law in the context of intentional torts is
a familiar move, for the simple reason that many intentional torts are also crimes
97 RESTATEMENT, § 13, cmt. e.
98 250 Neb. 711 (1996), cited in RESTATEMENT, § 16, Rptrs. Note, cmt. f.
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and, in the broader culture, criminal law dominates popular discourse when it
comes to assessing anti-social behavior. Additionally, because negligence–
rather than intentional torts – has taken center stage in the creation of tort
theories and in torts scholarship, there has not been much theorizing about
important intentional tort topics, such as the meaning of consent. It is under-
standable that one would look to developments in criminal law where there is
more writing about consent and sexual assault and the topic has been vigor-
ously debated during the deliberations of the Model Penal Code.
However, as I hope my discussion makes clear, I believe it would be a mistake
to model the Restatement provisions on the criminal law definition of consent.
The criminal law has been woefully under-protective of the interests of sexual
assault victims and still contains traces of the “force” and “resistance” require-
ments that historically were intertwined with the criminal law concept of consent.
The criminal law’s ambivalence about whether non-consensual sexual intercourse
(without force) ought to be considered a crime has meant that it has done little to
cut down on high rates of acquaintance rape or to curb “rape prone” sub-cultures.
If tort law were to follow its lead, we could expect the same result.
Most significantly, a good deal of the reluctance to embrace affirmative
consent under the criminal law has little or no bearing on tort law. Many critics
of affirmative consent are motivated, at least in part, to resist incorporating
victim-oriented approaches into the criminal law because of what they regard as
unconscionably high rates of incarceration in the U.S.99 Such anti-carceral critics
push against what they see as a trend toward over-criminalization and overly
punitive responses to pervasive forms of behavior.
Providing a remedy in tort, of course, does not contribute to mass
incarceration and does not trigger sexual offender registry laws or other
collateral consequences. Moreover, the procedural restrictions associated
with criminal law are not present in civil litigation: there are no tort princi-
ples requiring a presumption of innocence, proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
or a privileging of the rights of the defendant over the interests of the victim
to assure that a defendant’s liberty is not taken away without due process.
Additionally, deep concerns about the highly disproportionate effects of
criminal law on racial minorities and the poor are not readily transferable
to this aspect of tort law and civil litigation. There is no question that
criminal prosecutions pose a particular burden on poor, minority defendants
who are more likely than whites and more affluent defendants to be con-
99 See Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 651–657
(2009) (urging feminists to disengage from rape reforms that strengthen the penal state).
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victed and incarcerated.100 However, it is not the case that poor, minority
defendants are more likely to be sued in tort, particularly when one considers
that plaintiffs and their attorneys generally prefer to sue defendants who are
insured or have assets to satisfy tort judgments. Although racial and other
forms of invidious discrimination certainly do affect outcomes in individual
tort cases,101 adopting a victim-oriented rule such as affirmative consent in
intentional tort cases involving sexual conduct does not risk producing
systemic racial, ethnic or class bias against defendants.
In my judgment, tort law should look to developments in civil rights law as a
model for intentional tort sexual conduct cases. In many respects, doctrine under
Title VII and Title IX has developed against the grain of criminal law. It has
attempted to provide a remedy for victims of sexual misconduct in situations
where they was no punishment under the criminal law, reflecting a judgment that
the criminal law has historically been skewed against the interests of victims,
particularly women. Not surprisingly, when the interests of victims are prioritized,
criminal law definitions of consent must either be significantly changed or dis-
carded: Title VII changed our conception of what constitutes impermissible coer-
cion that renders consent ineffective; Title IX has altered our understanding of the
basic ingredients and nature of consent, particularly in cases of acquaintance rape.
The migration of civil rights principles into tort law is not a new phenom-
enon. In adjudicating claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, for
example, courts have permitted recovery in racial and sexual harassment cases
and have borrowed civil right concepts (e. g., hostile work environment) for that
purpose.102 Moreover, in recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly
interpreted Title VII “against the background of general tort law,”103 going so far
as to regard Title VII as “a federal tort.”104 By forging this connection between
civil rights and civil wrongs, the courts have eased the way for a similar
migration to occur in sexual battery claims.
100 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 9 (2010) (one in three young African American men are under control of
criminal justice system); Ian Haney Lopez, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass
Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023 (2010).
101 See MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, GENDER
& TORT LAW 184–188 (2010) (discussing six “pathways” by which race and gender influence U.
S. tort law).
102 See Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil Rights to Tort
Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2115, 2118–2119 (2007).
103 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011).
104 Id. On the migration process, see generally, Martha Chamallas & Sandra F. Sperino, Torts and
Civil Rights Law: Migration and Conflict: Symposium Introduction, 75 OHIO ST. L. J. 1021 (2014).
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To date, tort law has been underutilized in addressing sexual violence, at
least with respect to claims against individual perpetrators.105 As Ellen Bublick’s
research demonstrates,106 the vast majority of tort claims for sexual assault are
brought as “third-party” negligence claims against institutional defendants,
holding landlords, schools, and commercial enterprises liable for failing to
take reasonable precautions to prevent assaults. It also appears that a large
number of these “third-party” negligence claims involve rapes and assaults by
strangers, rather than acquaintance rapes. In comparison, few intentional tort
suits are brought directly against the assailant. As the Reporters of the
Restatement have recognized, there has been a paucity of successful tort recov-
eries against assailants, given the “overwhelming evidence of the frequency of
sexual assault.”107
The underutilization of intentional tort claims for sexual misconduct comes
with a cost. Recently, Sara Swan has reminded us of the importance of having
“complainant-driven processes” in the sexual assault context.108 She stresses that
“by enabling a person to bring a claim or not, at his or her discretion, tort law is
understood as empowering victims.” In contrast to criminal law, tort law has the
potential to reinforce the agency of a victim-plaintiff and to give her an opportu-
nity to assert her “inherent dignity.”109 Particularly in cases of sexual misconduct,
where victims’ perspectives and interests have historically been suppressed or
minimized, allowing the victim to drive the process has great value.
On a more practical level, tort law offers distinct advantages in litigating
claims for sexual misconduct. Because tort law remedies are individualized, with
damages set at the amount of harm suffered by the individual plaintiff, there is
no need to make difficult decisions about the relative seriousness of particular
types of conduct. Thus, in tort law, for example, there is no need to classify non-
forcible, non-consensual intercourse as either a misdemeanor or a felony, a
contentious debate within criminal law. Similarly, in sexual misconduct cases
involving harmful or offensive touchings other than sexual intercourse, the
relative seriousness of the particular injury can be measured by the amount of
actual damages proven, just as in other tort cases. Overall, the structure and
process of tort litigation makes it a valuable tool in combatting the high
105 See Tom Lininger, Is it Wrong to Sue for Rape? 57 DUKE L. J. 1557, 1568 (2008).
106 Ellen M. Bublick, Tort Suits Filed by Rape and Sexual Assault Victims in Civil Courts: Lessons
for Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies, 59 SMU L. REV. 55, 58–61 (2006).
107 RESTATEMENT (THIRD), § 12, cmt. d.
108 Sarah L. Swan, Between Title IX and the Criminal Law: Bringing Tort Law to the Campus
Sexual Assault Debate, 64 KAN. L.REV. 961, 970 (2016).
109 Id. citing JOHN C. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S.
LAW: TORTS 6 (2010).
34 M. Chamallas
Brought to you by | De Gruyter / TCS
Authenticated
Download Date | 4/11/18 5:49 PM
incidence of sexual assault. Although tort law is likely never to become the
primary vehicle for addressing sexual violence and assault, its role as a supple-
mentary remedy could be enhanced by the aligning tort law with civil rights
principles and adopting a rule of affirmative consent.
Finally, the Title IX models of affirmative consent could readily be adapted to
fashion a rule governing consent in intentional tort cases of sexual misconduct.
Both the California and New York affirmative consent statutes, described earlier,110
contain appropriate language to borrow for such a purpose, providing that affirma-
tive consent requires a “conscious,” “voluntary,” “decision” or “agreement” to
engage in sexual activity, creating a “mutual” obligation to ensure that the actor
has secured permission from the other party. Perhaps most importantly, each
specifies that “silence,” “lack of protest” or “lack of resistance” does not “mean”
or “demonstrate” consent. Because affirmative consent is fundamentally incompa-
tible with the doctrine of apparent consent, if the Restatement were to adopt
affirmative consent, it must also clarify that apparent consent may not be applied
in such a context. Finally, if affirmative consent were the governing standard, it
would be clear that the burden of proving such consent should rest with the
defendant, consistent with his or her obligation to secure permission before invad-
ing the interests of the plaintiff.
As a second-best option, I would prefer that the Restatement expressly take
no position as to whether its “general” consent provisions defining actual
consent, apparent consent and burden of proof apply to sexual conduct cases.
Such neutrality would send a clear signal that states are free to treat consent in
sexual conduct cases differently from other intentional tort claims and would
clear the way for adoption of affirmative consent. Although the current draft
mentions that a jurisdiction might adopt a rule of affirmative consent – parti-
cularly if affirmative consent is used in that state’s criminal law – it does not
make clear that apparent consent is incompatible with affirmative consent, nor
does it recognize that placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff to prove lack of
consent in such a jurisdiction makes little sense.
The current draft of the Restatement sidesteps the important debate on
affirmative consent and sends mixed messages. Although affirmative consent
is not ruled out completely, the draft underappreciates the significant role tort
law could play if it did not simply track developments in criminal law. Given the
current dissatisfaction with criminal law solutions to pressing social problems,
the Restatement should not miss this opportunity to help fashion a distinctive
tort law of consent.
110 See supra at nn. 19, 64.
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